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THE NUMEROUS FEDERAL LEGAL DEFINITIONS
OF TERRORISM:
THE PROBLEM OF TOO MANY GRAILS
Nicholas J. Perry*
"When all who were to take part in the Quest [of the Holy Grail] had taken the oath,
those who were keeping the record found the tally to be one hundred and fifty... ."
I. INTRODUCTION
The search for a definition for terrorism has aptly been compared to the quest for
the Holy Grail by King Arthur's Knights of the Round Table, with "eager souls set[ting]
out, full of purpose, energy and self-confidence, to succeed where so many others have
failed.",2 Like definitions of terrorism, the "Holy Grail assumes many forms."'3 How-
ever, unlike the Grail Quest, where many sought the Grail but only a few knights ac-
complished the quest,4 many searchers located a definition of terrorism. The different
proposed scholarly and legal definitions of terrorism are more numerous than the 150
knights seeking the grail, and definitional consensus has been at least as elusive as the
Grail.
Federal law provides numerous, although fewer than 150, definitions of the term
"terrorism." 5 This Article examines twenty-two definitions or descriptions of terrorism
* Attorney, Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, El
Paso, Texas. B.A. University of Notre Dame, 1990, J.D. North Carolina Central School of Law, 1997. The
opinions contained in this Article are solely the author's and do not represent those of the Department of
Homeland Security, any of its components, or any other of its employees.
1. THE QUEST OF THE HOLY GRAIL 50 (Pauline Matarasso trans., 1969).
2. Geoffrey Levitt, Is 'Terrorism' Worth Defining?, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 97, 97 (1986); OMAR MALIK,
ENOUGH OF THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM xvii (2000) ("[T]he search for a single definition has come to
resemble the quest for the Holy Grail."); James A.R. Nafziger, The Grave New World of Terrorism, 31 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (2002) ("[A]n operation definition [of terrorism] remains the Holy Grail of the
terrorism debate."); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REv. 1, 119 (1996) ("Ade-
quately defining 'political terrorism,' however, is the Holy Grail of political violence scholarship.").
3. NEW ARTHURIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 213 (Norris J. Lacy ed., 1996) (1991); compare A.T. Hatto, Fore-
word to WOLFRAM VON ESCHENBACH, PARZIVAL 7 (A.T. Hatto trans., 1980) ("[T]here were stories of as
many different Grails as there were writers or syndicates exploiting the potent name."), with L. Paul Bremer
Ill, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, Address Before the Commonwealth Club of California, San Franciso
(April 23, 1987), in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU PUB. AFF., CURRENT POLICY No. 947 at 2 ("There are as
many definitions [of terrorism] around as there are definers.").
4. In some versions of the Grail Quest three knights find the grail, while other versions of the legend
differ on the number and name of the quest achievers. See generally NEW ARTHURIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 3, at 212-13.
5. Although beyond the scope of this Article, there is a similar lack of consensus in international law.
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and related terms in federal law. Scholarly discussions on the difficulties of defining the
term terrorism are examined in Part 11. Part III analyzes current definitions of terrorism
throughout federal law. Part IV then discusses three possible alternatives to the numer-
ous federal definitions, namely maintaining the status quo, abandoning legal definitions
of terrorism, and combining the current definitions into a single entity. The conclusion
argues for a single definition.
II. SCHOLARSHIP ON THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING TERRORISM
The scholarly literature on terrorism is "vast and ever expanding." 6 Although some
scholars ignore the need for a definition of terrorism 7 or resort to Justice Stewart's
comment on obscenity, "I know it when I see it," 8 many others join the definitional
quest. As H.H.A. Cooper observed, "[M]any conferences and writings on the subject of
terrorism begin with the obligatory, almost ritualistic recitation by the presenter of some
preferred definition of terrorism." 9 These obligatory definitional recitations have re-
sulted in numerous definitions of terrorism in the scholarship on the topic. A 1983 study
by Alex P. Schmid catalogued 109 different definitions of terrorism used between 1936
and 1980,10 and "[m]ore definitions have appeared since."' 1'
The search for a definition of terrorism has been described by Cooper in an earlier
article as "the problem of the problem of definition."' 2 The problem continues notwith-
See Levitt, supra note 2, at 97-103; Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peace Time Equivalent of
War Crimes: A Case of Too Much Convergence between International Humanitarian Law and International
Criminal Law, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 391, 391 (2001) ("The problem of defining 'terrorism' has vexed
the international community for years."); Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us":
International Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'L L.J. 153, 165-92 (1994); Thomas
M. Franck & Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., Preliminary Thoughts Toward an International Convention in Terrorism,
68 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 72-82 (1974); see also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 106 (2d. Cir. 2003) ("We
regrettably are no closer... to an international consensus on the definition of terrorism, or even its proscrip-
tion.").
6. Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 193. For a bibliography of terrorism scholarship, see JONATHAN R.
WHITE, TERRORISM: AN INTRODUCTION 293-314 (3d. ed. 2002); for an analysis of themes in "terrorism
literature," see also lena M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 119.
7. See WHITE, supra note 6, at 10; Levitt, supra note 2, at 97.
8. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring); e.g., Aaron J. Noteboom,
Comment, Terrorism: I know it when I see it, 81 OR. L. REV. 553, 553 (2002); H.H.A. Cooper, Terrorism: The
Problem of Definitions Revisited, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 881, 892 (2001) ("As with obscenity, we know
terrorism well enough when we see it."); JEFFREY RECORD, BOUNDING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 9
(2003), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/bounding/bounding.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2004) ("We know a terrorist act when we see one ...."); James D. Fry, Comment, Terrorism as a Crime
Against Humanity and Genocide: The Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 169, 181 (2002); Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 161.
9. Cooper, supra note 8, at 882. Even scholars critical of the efforts to find a definition propose their
own definitions. See, e.g., WALTER LAQUEUR, THE AGE OF TERRORISM 72 (1987) (describing terrorism as
"the use of covert violence by a group for political ends" but warning, "[it can be predicted with confidence
that the disputes about a single comprehensive, detailed definition of terrorism will continue for a long time,
that they will not result in a consensus, and that they will make no notable contribution toward the understand-
ing of terrorism"); MALIK, supra note 2, at 57-62 (proposing two definitions of terrorism in a book entitled
ENOUGH OF THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM). At the risk of defying ritual, the present Article does not propose
a definition of terrorism.
10. ALEX P. SCHMID, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A RESEARCH GUIDE TO CONCEPTS, THEORIES, DATA
BASES AND LITERATURE 119-52 (1983). The vast majority of the 109 cataloged definitions are from scholarly
sources.
11. Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 161; see also LAQUEUR, supra note 9, at 143 ("[Tlhere is every reason
to assume there have been more [definitions] since [Schmid].").
12. H.H.A. Cooper, Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition, 26 CHITrY'S L.J. 105, 105
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standing, or perhaps in part because of, the numerous scholars seeking a definition. It
has been lamented that further progress has not been made in defining terrorism,
"[diespite the increasingly large volume of publications addressing terrorism."' 3 How-
ever, this should only be expected since one of the purposes of scholarly publications is
to disagree:1 4 a large quantity of publications on a topic will inherently result in dis-
agreements. The lack of definitional consensus on terrorism, however, is attributable to
more than the nature of scholarship; more fundamentally, it reflects the nature of the
term being defined.
The definers disagree on what should be included in a definition of terrorism.
Schmid's 1983 study cataloged twenty-two different elements which appeared in more
than one of the 109 definitions of terrorism, with only three elements, "Violence,
Force," "Political," and "Fear, Terror," appearing in at least half of the definitions. 5
The vast majority of definitions of terrorism contain some reference to the two most
common components from Schmid's review, violence 6 and a political purpose or moti-
vation.17 Beyond those elements, there is widespread disagreement as to what compo-
nents should be included in a definition. For example, some definitions include the
targeting of "innocents" as a component. 8 Others criticize such an approach. 19 Another
area of disagreement is whether terrorism must be performed by a group, as opposed to
an individual acting without organizational support. 20  There are differences in the
scholarly writings on whether actions by governments should be included in the defini-
(1978) ("The problem of the definition of terrorism is more than semantic. It is really a cloak for a complexity
of problems, psychological, political, legalistic, and practical."). Id. at 107.
13. Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism-Jurisdictional and Definitional Clarifications, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 239 (1995).
14. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, The Assault on Scholarship, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 993, 1000 (1991)
("When writing for the academic and professional legal audience, a professor must do much more than enter-
tain; the scholar is forced to analyze, reflect, disagree, and pose alternative conceptions, methods, and para-
digms.").
15. SCHMID, supra note 10, at 76-77. Schmid creates a definition using 13 of the 22 elements. Id. at 111.
16. Id. at 11. ("There is hardly a definition of terrorism [that] does not contain the word 'violence."');
WALTER LAQUEUR, THE NEW TERRORISM 6 (1999) ("Perhaps the only characteristic generally agreed upon is
that terrorism always involves violence or the threat of violence."); Nafziger, supra note 2, at 9.
17. MALIK, supra note 2, at 52 ("General convention has long held that terrorism must have a political
component."); LAQUEUR, supra note 9, at 143; SCHMID, supra note 10, at 57; see also FIROoz E. ZADEH,
ISLAM VERSUS TERRORISM 23 (2002) ("[Ilit is difficult to leave the motivation out of the definition [of terror-
ism]."); Nafziger, supra note 2, at 9.
18. See, e.g., Benjamin Netanyahu, Defining Terrorism, in TERRORISM: How THE WEST CAN WIN 9
(Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986) ("What distinguishes terrorism is the willful and calculated choice of inno-
cents as targets .... Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the inno-
cent to inspire fear for political ends."); see also Porras, supra note 6, at 129 ("Indeed, terrorism is often de-
fined in relation to the 'innocence' of its victims.").
19. See, e.g., Theodore P. Seto, The Morality of Terrorism, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1227, 1236-39 (2002);
Franck & Lockwood, supra note 5, at 80; SCHMID, supra note 10, at 79-80.
20. Compare BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 42-43 (1998) ("To qualify as terrorism, violence
must be perpetrated by some organizational entity with at least some conspiratorial structure and identifiable
chain of command beyond a single individual acting on his or her own."), and MALIK, supra note 2, at 18
("There is a common reluctance to apply the term 'terrorism' to the activity of an individual .... ), with
Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 59,
65 (2000) ("[Tlerrorism is defined as the calculated employment or the threat of violence by individuals,
subnational groups, and state actors to attain political, social, and economic objectives in the violation of law,
intended to create an overwhelming fear in a target area larger than the victims attacked or threatened." (em-
phasis added)). Legal definitions of terrorism generally are not limited to group conduct and several explicitly
include actions by individuals. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22)(A) (2000); 22 U.S.C. § 2708(j)(1) (2000); see
also United States v. Hicks, 997 F.2d 594, 599 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Although Hicks was not a member of an
organized group, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Hicks' actions consti-
tuted 'terrorism."').
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tion of terrorism.2' Additionally, some argue that any definition of terrorism needs to
include a component excusing terrorism when rendered for a just cause,22 while others
criticize definitions that involve judgment of the cause.23
Several reasons for the lack of definitional consensus have been advanced in terror-
ism scholarship.24 One of the more frequently cited reasons is the changing nature of
terrorism. 25 A prominent scholar of the topic has argued "[n]o definition can possibly
cover all the varieties of terrorism that have appeared through history. 26 The difficul-
ties in defining terrorism caused by the changing nature of the term apply not only to the
past but also to the future, since no definition can cover all of what a prospective terror-
ist might do.27
The changing nature of the term through time is by no means the only reason for the
definitional difficulties. One recognized reason is reckless use of the term, especially in
the media. Terrorism is a "loose label" that has been applied to the actions of various
political extremists, as well as ordinary criminals. 28 The careless use of the terminology
resulted in "loose thought on the subject." 29
Probably the most significant reason for the lack of definitional consensus is the
judgmental nature of the word terrorism. 30 As Cooper observed, "The term 'terrorism'
is a judgmental one in that it not only encompasses some event produced by human
behavior but seeks to assign a value or quality to that behavior., 31 The very use of the
word not only describes an event but also assigns a moral judgment to the act and the
actor, a moral judgment, which is nearly universally negative.
21. Compare LAQUEUR, supra note 9, at 146 (arguing against considering state actions as terrorism), with
RECORD, supra note 8, at 7 (arguing that state terrorism should be included in the definition), and Alexander,
supra note 20, at 65 (including "state actors" in the definition of terrorism). See also SCHMID, supra note 10,
at 105 ("If a revolutionary movement like the [Nazis] in the 1920s, by a combination of terroristic, violent, and
legal means manages to gain state power, and thereafter continues to wield power with a similar mix of meth-
ods, it would be artificial... to rebaptize the terroristic methods into something different for the period after
1933.").
22. See, e.g., Beres, supra note 13, at 249 ("[Tlhe United States should immediately begin to articulate
and to apply a single set of standards... supported by both just cause and just means ...."); Seto, supra note
19.
23. See, e.g., SCHMID, supra note 10, at 100 ("[W]e can define terrorism without entering the value-
ladden area of moving causes."); BREMER, supra note 3, at 2; Netanyahu, supra note 18, at 12 ("[T]errorism is
always unjustifiable, regardless of the professed or real goals.").
24. There is a large and growing subgroup of terrorism scholarship specifically related to the definitional
difficulties. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 2; Noteboom, supra note 8; Cooper, supra note 8; Charles Ruby, The
Definition of Terrorism, ANALYSIS OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y, 2002, at 9; BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, THE
STUDY OF TERRORISM: DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS (1980); see also MALIK, supra note 2, at xvii ("The search
for a definition of terrorism has been long and painful and is now living a separate life of its own.").
25. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 15 ("The most compelling reason perhaps is because the mean-
ing of the term has changed so frequently over the past two hundred years."); WHITE, supra note 6, at 3
("[Tihe nature of terrorism has changed over the course of history."); ZADEH, supra note 17, at 29.
26. LAQUEUR, supra note 9, at 11. For a discussion of the changes of terrorism through history, see id. at
11-23; HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 15-28.
27. JENKINS, supra note 24, at 10.
28. Id. at 9-10; see also Beres, supra note 13, at 240 ("[T]he term has become so broad and so imprecise
that it embraces even the most discrepant activities.").
29. LAQUEUR, supra note 9, at 299; see also JENKINS, supra note 24, at 2 ("What we have, in sum, is the
sloppy use of a word that is rather imprecisely defined to begin with.").
30. See, e.g. WHITE, supra note 6, at 4 ("[Tlerrorism is difficult to define because it has a pejorative
connotation."); see also RECORD, supra note 8, at 8 ("The definitional mire that surrounds terrorism stems in
large measure from differing perspectives on the moral relationship between objectives sought and means
employed."); ZADEH, supra note 17, at 29 ("The meaning of terrorist differs depending on who are the indi-
viduals describing it, their motives, and when it is defined.").
31. Cooper, supra note 12, at 106.
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The pejorative nature of the term is the one point upon which everyone seems to
agree.32 To some, this pejorative connotation is the defining quality of terrorism:
With terrorism .... everyone means the same thing. What changes is not the meaning
of the word, but rather the groups and activities each person would include or exclude
from the list. Everyone uses the word 'terrorism' to mean a kind of violence of which
he or she does not approve, and about which he or she wants something done. The
sense of the word always stays the same; it is the referents that change.
33
The pejorative nature of the word terrorism gives power to those who can attach the
term to others. "Use of the term [terrorism] implies a moral judgment; and if one party
can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly per-
suaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint." 34 A person or group is politically and so-
cially degraded when described as terrorist, a5 and governments have labeled opponents
"terrorists" in order to maintain power.3 6 The degradation of the label is, however, not
always permanent; at least three former or current leaders of groups once widely consid-
ered terrorist organizations have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize: Menachem Begin
of the Irgun,37 Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress, 8 and Yasser Arafat of
the Palestinian Liberation Organization. a
A related issue in the definitional quest is the natural desire not to use the term
terrorism to describe one's own actions or even actions of those one approves, since
"[t]errorism is what the bad guys do."''4 Events from American history, which are gen-
32. HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 31 ("On one point, at least, everyone agrees: terrorism is a pejorative
term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one's enemies and oppo-
nent's, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore.").
33. Porras, supra note 6, at 124.
34. JENKINS, supra note 24, at 1.
35. WHITE, supra note 6, at 4.
36. See Seto, supra note 19, at 1235 ("Condemnation of terrorism becomes merely an instrument for the
preservation of existing power relationships."); WHITE, supra note 6, at 6 ("Governments can increase their
power when they label opponents as 'terrorists.' Citizens seem more willing to accept more abuses of gov-
ernmental power when a counterterrorism campaign is in progress."); RECORD, supra note 8, at 8 ("It is easy
for the politically satisfied and militarily powerful to pronounce all terrorism evil regardless of circumstance..
• ."1).
37. Seto, supra note 19, at 1227-29. The Irgun was a Zionist organization active in British-controlled
Palestine in the 1940's responsible for, inter alia, the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem which
killed 91 people. Id. See also WHITE, supra note 6, at 100 ("A Jewish terrorist organization called the Irgun
Zvai Leumi launched a series of attacks against British soldiers and Arab Palestinians."); LAQUEUR, supra
note 16, at 23.
38. Amy C. Roma, Note, Assassinations: Executive Orders and World Stability, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.
109, 135 (2002) ("In the past, the United States classified Nobel Peace Prize recipient Nelson Mandela as a
terrorist, and had the African National Congress, the movement to end apartheid, on its terrorist watch list.");
Makua Mutua, Terrorism and Human Rights: Power, Culture, and Subordination, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
1, 9 (2002); see also Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 208 D.L.R. (4th) 1,
95 ("Perhaps the most striking example of the politicized nature of the term [terrorism] is that Nelson Man-
dela's African National Congress was, during the apartheid era, routinely labeled a terrorist organization, not
only by the South African government but by much of the international community.").
39. Beres, supra note 13, at 246-47; WHITE, supra note 6, at 144; see also ZADEH, supra note 17, at 28
("The terrorist of yesterday is the hero of today, and the hero of yesterday becomes the terrorist of today.");
LAQUEUR, supra note 16, at 23 (referring to "the many cases of guerrilla or terrorist leaders having a second,
political career after their fighting days were over").
40. JENKINS, supra note 24, at 1; see also Cooper, supra note 8, at 884 ("It must be stressed that there is a
basic antinomy here: What I do, however unpleasant is not terrorism; what you do is terrorism."); BRIAN
CROZIER, THE REBELS: A STUDY OF POST-WAR INSURRECTIONISTS 168 (1960) ("Often enough, the victim of
terrorism are 'us', whereas the victims bombing raids are 'them."'), quoted in SCHMID, supra note 10, at 48.
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erally praised, such as the Boston Tea Party, which helped trigger the American Revolu-
tion, and John Brown's anti-slavery raid on the federal arsenal at Harper's Ferry, would
fall under many current definitions of terrorism.4 1 Since terrorism is pejorative, "the
decision to call someone or label some organization 'terrorist' becomes almost unavoid-
ably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the
person / group / cause concerned.,, 42 The subjectivity of the term has led to the oft-
repeated 43 and nearly as often criticized 44 cliche, "One person's terrorist is another per-
son's freedom fighter."
This succinct review of the terrorism scholarship shows that the lack of definitional
consensus can be explained though several different possibilities, including the changing
nature of terrorism, sloppy use of the term, and, most importantly, the pejorative and
subjective nature of the term terrorism.
III. DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM IN FEDERAL LAW
United States federal lawmakers' attempts to craft a definition of terrorism began
relatively late. At the time of Schmid's 1983 study and its listing of 109 definitions for
terrorism, there was only one definition of terrorism in the United States Code, the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) definition of international terrorism.
45
Despite this late start, American lawmakers finally entered the definitional quest includ-
ing creating several new statutory definitions enacted since the attacks of September 11,
2001. Additionally, the executive branch joined the definitional quest, providing defini-
tions of terrorism in the Code of Federal Regulations and an Executive Order.46 "The
41. Seto, supra note 19, at 1230; see also Louis Rene Beres, The Legal Meaning of Terrorism for the
Military Commander, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1995) ("Ironically, using certain of the prevailing definitions
of terrorism adopted by some U.S. government agencies and some scholars, the American Revolution ...
[would] conceivably [be an] example[] of 'terrorism."'); WHITE, supra note 6, at 8 ("Ironically, some Latin
American revolutionaries who oppose our repressive friends espouse the rights expressed in the U.S. Declara-
tion of Independence and Constitution, yet we refer to them as terrorists."). But see United States v. Jordan,
223 F.3d 676, 694 n.15 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a comparison between the actions of a supporter of Puerto
Rican independence involved in a bombing campaign and the Boston Tea Party since "no attempt was made to
blow up the ship" in the Boston Tea Party).
42. HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 31; see also Grenville Byford, The Wrong War, 81 FOREIGN AFF. July-
Aug. 2002, at 34 ("Like beauty, it would seem, that terrorism is in the eye of the beholder."); MALIK, supra
note 2, at 32 ("Context, or viewpoint, is everything in the definition of terrorism."); SCHMID, supra note 10, at
6 ("The question of definition of a term like terrorism can not be detached from the question of who is the
defining agency.").
43. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 8, at 882 ("One person's terrorist will ever remain another's freedom
fighter. The process of definition is wholly frustrated by the presence of irreconcilable antagonisms."); Levitt,
supra note 2, at 109-10 ("[T]he dictum 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' can be seen as a
statement not so much of an inherent moral conundrum, but of an international political reality."); Nafziger,
supra note 2, at 8; Monette Zard, Exclusion, Terrorism, and the Refugee Convention, 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BULL. 933, 934 (2002); SCHMID, supra note 10, at 112; see also Cheema v. INS, 350 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir.
2003) ("One country's terrorist can often be another country's freedom fighter.").
44. See, e.g., LAQUEUR, supra note 9, at 7 ("Of all the observations on terrorism this is surely one of the
tritest."); Netanyahu, supra note 18, at 7; SCHMID, supra note 10, at 112-13; JENKINS, supra note 24, at 2
("One man's terrorist is everyone's terrorist."); see also United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 338
n.4 (2d. Cit. 1986) ("Whether or not acts of terrorism are committed to enhance the freedom of others, the
perpetrators are acting not only beyond the law, but beyond the pale of civilized conduct when they take
innocent lives.").
45. Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101, 92 Stat. 1783, 1784 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801); Levitt, supra
note 2, at 104. Schmid did not include that definition in his list of 109 definitions but did include a definition
from a proposed bill. SCHMID, supra note 10, at 146-47.
46. See infra Part III.F.
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definitions run from the fairly simple to extremely complex. ' '47 There are at least nine-
teen different definitions or descriptions of terrorism, 48 as well as three terms relating to
the support of terrorism, 49 in federal law.
Legal definitions of terrorism generally fall into one of two categories, described by
Geoffrey Levitt as deductive and inductive. 50  Deductive definitions "cover[] a wide
variety of criminal conduct, but only under certain circumstances" and are "character-
ized by the use of a fairly broad substantive element and a general, politically oriented
intent element." 51 These definitions generally use the term terrorism 52 and attempt to
create a complete definition "into which all 'terrorist' acts would then fit."' 53 Definitions
under the deductive approach typically consist of three parts: (a) a substantive element
containing the prohibited conduct, (b) an intent or motivation requirement, and (c) a
jurisdictional element.54
The inductive approach, by contrast, "relies upon a relatively precise description of
the conduct constituting the substantive element and omits the political intent require-
ment that characterizes the deductive approach. 55 Inductive definitions are generally
limited to specified conduct and do not attempt to cover all conduct which might be
terrorism. 56 The term terrorism is not explicitly included in the definition, "though it
may find its way into a preamble.,
57
A. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
The oldest statutory definition of terrorism in federal law is the FISA definition of
"international terrorism," which is defined as activities that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal viola-
tion if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended-
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
47. Noteboom, supra note 8, at 568.
48. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1) (2000 & West Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C.A. §
2331(5) (West Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) (2000 & West Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(1)
(2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (2000); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1993 (West Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2000); 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(22) (2000); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000 & West Supp. 2003); 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)
(2000); 22 U.S.C. § 27080)(1) (2000); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 2(15), 116
Stat. 2135, 2141; § 865(2), 116 Stat. at 2242; Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §
102(l)(A), 116 Stat. 2322, 2323-24; 49 U.S.C.A. § 44703(g)(3) (West Supp. 2003); Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14(1), 110 Stat. 1541, 1549; Exec. Order No. 13224, § 3, 66 Fed. Reg.
49,079, 49,080 (Sept. 23, 2001); 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1) (2003).
49. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339(a) (West Supp. 2003) (harboring or concealing terrorists); 18 U.S.C.A. §
2339A(a) (2000 & West Supp. 2003) (providing material support for terrorists); 8 U.S.C.A. §
I I82(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2000 & West Supp. 2003) (engaging in terrorist activity).
50. Levitt, supra note 2, at 97. Malik similarly, although not identically, divides terrorism definitions into
extrinsic and intrinsic "routes to definition." MALIK, supra note 2, at 19-25. Other commentators identify
different components to legal definitions of terrorism. See, e.g., Franck & Lockwood, supra note 5, at 72-82.
51. Levitt, supra note 2, at 108-09.
52. Id. at 109.
53. Id. at 97.
54. Id. at 104. Levitt uses jurisdiction to refer to location of the conduct, not in the traditional legal use of
the term concerning which courts may exercise authority over such conduct.
55. Id. at 109.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms
of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to
coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asy-
lum.
5 8
This definition is a deductive definition with the first subsection containing the substan-
tive element, namely that it be a violent act that violates some American criminal law.
59
The intent requirement is in the second subsection, and the jurisdictional element, which
makes the conduct "international," constitutes the third subsection.
60
FISA "establish[ed] a procedure under which the Attorney General can obtain a ju-
dicial order authorizing electronic surveillance in the United States to acquire informa-
tion for foreign intelligence purposes., 6 1 Although the definition of "international ter-
rorism" remains unchanged since its 1978 enactment,62 amendments to FISA increased
the reach of the Act.6 3 The reach of its definition of terrorism makes the FISA definition
one of the most significant in federal law. Additionally, this first statutory definition of
terrorism is the model for several subsequent definitions.
64
B. Criminal Code Definitions
Title 18 of the United States Code-the Criminal Code---contains the most defini-
tions of terrorism; it includes a chapter entitled "terrorism, '65 as well as definitions of
terrorism in other parts of the title. The basic definitions of terrorism in the terrorism
chapter, found in 18 U.S.C. § 2331, mirror the FISA definition. The definition of "in-
ternational terroism,' '66 enacted in 199267 and amended slightly in 2001 by the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act),68 is a verbatim copy of the FISA defmi-
tion,69 with the exception that the motivation component includes affecting governments
58. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000).
59. § 1801(c)(1). See also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 726 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) ("'In-
ternational terrorism,' by definition [under FISA], requires the investigation of activities that constitute
crimes.").
60. See generally Levitt, supra note 2, at 104-05 (discussing the FISA international terrorism definition).
61. United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
62. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c), with Pub. L. 95-511, § 101, 92 Stat. 1783, 1784 (1978).
63. See generally Alison A. Bradley, Comment, Extremism in the Defense of Liberty?: The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Significance of the USA PATRIOT Act, 77 TUL. L. REV. 465, 481-82 &
485-89 (2002); William Michael, A Window on Terrorism: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 58
BENCH & BAR OF MINN., Nov. 2001, at 23; see also Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA Patriot Act
Will Permit Governmental Infringement upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of 'Intelligence' Investiga-
tions, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1658 (2002) (characterizing the USA PATRIOT Act amendments to FISA as
bestowing "far-reaching and unwarranted surveillance authority [to] law enforcement and intelligence agen-
cies."); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 at 735 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (discussing the reach of
FISA under the USA PATRIOT Act).
64. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1) (2000 & West Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(5) (West Supp.
2003); 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(22) (2000); 49 U.S.C.A. § 44703(g)(3) (West Supp. 2003); Exec. Order No. 13224, §
3, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079,49,080 (Sept. 23, 2001).
65. Chapter 113B - Terrorism, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339B.
66. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1) (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
67. The Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 1003(a)(3), 106 Stat. 4506,
4521.
68. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802(a)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001). See generally Michael T. McCarthy,
Recent Development: USA PATRIOTAct, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435 (2002); Bradley, supra note 63.
69. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000); see also supra Part IH.A.
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by "mass destruction" in addition to assassination and kidnapping. 70 Likewise, the defi-
nition of "domestic terrorism, ' '71 enacted in 2001 as part of the USA PATRIOT Act,72 is
identical to the definition of FISA except for the inclusion of "mass destruction" in the
motivation component73 and the jurisdictional requirement that limits the definition to
"domestic." The definition of "domestic terrorism" requires that the event "occur pri-
marily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States" 74 as opposed to requiring
conduct outside of the United States or transcending national boundaries under the FISA
and § 2331 "international terrorism" definitions.75 Both definitions are deductive with a
requirement that the conduct "appear[s] to be intended" to affect or influence a govern-
ment or population 76 and potentially include all acts of terrorism.
Despite being located within the federal criminal code, the § 2331 definitions of ter-
rorism are not elements of criminal offenses. However, the § 2331 definitions of terror-
ism have been incorporated into a wide variety of other contexts. Statutory provisions
have referred to the § 2331 definitions in provisions: 1) governing the possession, use,
and transfer of biological agents and toxins;77 2) expanding warrant authority for terror-
ism investigations; 78 3) determining civil liability for acts of international terrorism
against United States nationals; 79 4) rewarding the furnishing of information on terror-
ism;80 5) granting immunity for airline employees who report suspicious behavior relat-
ing to terrorism; 81 6) disclosing of tax82 and education 83 information during terrorism
investigations; 7) and removing liability protections for otherwise shielded volunteers
and teachers who engage in international terrorism while in the scope of volunteering84
or teaching. 85 The § 2331 definitions have further been incorporated into regulations
involving the disclosure of financial information 86 and grants for assistance to victims of
crime.87 Through such wide application in a variety of contexts, the definitions in §
2331 are among the most significant definitions of terrorism in federal law.
The § 2331 definitions are not the only definitions of terrorism in the terrorism
chapter of the federal criminal code. The chapter defines "federal crime of terrorism" as
70. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 2003).
71. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(5) (West Supp. 2003).
72. § 802 (a)(5), 115 Stat. at 376.
73. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(5)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 2003).
74. § 2331(5)(c).
75. § 2331(1); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000).
76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 233 1(1)(B) (2000 & West Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(5)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262a(e)(3)(B)(ii)(ll) (West Supp. 2003); 7 U.S.C.A. § 8401(e)(3)(B)(ii)(fl) (West
Supp. 2003).
78. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(3) (granting magistrate judges the authority to issue warrants valid outside of
the judges' districts for the purpose of terrorism investigations).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000); see also Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir.
2002); Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 228 F. Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.R.I. 2002).
80. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3077(1) (West Supp. 2003).
81. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44941(a) (West Supp. 2003) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3077, which refers to 18 U.S.C. §
2331).
82. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(b)(1 1) (West Supp. 2003).
83. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(j)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2003).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(f)(1)(A) (2000).
85. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6736(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2003).
86. 31 C.F.R. § 103.90(b) (2003).
87. Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) Victim Assistance Grant Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,444, 56,448 (pro-
posed Sept. 3, 2002) (revising Guidelines for Victims of Crime Act Victim Assistance Grant Program, § I(N),
and § 1(0)). At least one state statute also refers to 18 U.S.C. § 2331 in determining eligibility for victim
compensation. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 351-2, (c) (Michie 2002) (defining "victim").
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an offense "calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation
or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct '88 and that violates enumerated
crimes. 89 Under this two-part definition, various crimes become federal crimes of ter-
rorism when intended to influence or affect a government. The definition is deductive
but does not include an explicit jurisdictional component. Its political intent aspect is in
the first part, and the substantive component is achieved in the second part through ref-
erence to other criminal provisions of the United States Code. Although the definition
of "federal crime of terrorism" is part of a criminal provision, it is not used as part of the
§ 2331 criminal elements or penalty provisions but rather refers to the investigative
power of the Attorney General. 90 Additionally, the definition serves as a basis for sen-
tence enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 91 Due to its rare
applicability, the definition of "federal crime of terrorism" is of limited significance.
The section with the "federal crime of terrorism" definition, § 2332b, is one of sev-
eral provisions in the terrorism chapter with implicit definitions of terrorism. Section
2332b criminalizes, inter alia, killing, maiming, and committing assaults, which result
in serious bodily injury against a person within the United States "involving conduct
transcending national boundaries. ' 92 There is no mention of terrorism in the criminal
provisions of the statutory section, nor is there any political component necessary for a
conviction under this section.
Similarly, § 2339 criminalizes "harboring or concealing terrorists" ' 93 without requir-
ing any political motivation of the harborer, the concealer, or the terrorist. Specifically,
this provision provides that "[w]hoever harbors or conceals any person he knows, or has
reasonable grounds to believe, has committed, or is about to commit" various specified
criminal offenses shall be imprisoned for up to ten years. 94 Likewise, § 2339A, entitled
"Providing material support to terrorists," criminalizes "provid[ing] material support or
resources or conceal[ing] or disguis[ing] the nature, location, source, or ownership of
material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in prepara-
tion for, or in carrying out, a violation of' thirty-five listed criminal provisions.95 There
is no requirement of political motivation for either the material support or the activity
supported,96 and no definition of terrorism is included in this section. Indeed, the words
"terrorism" and "terrorists" do not appear in the section after the section title. The sec-
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A) (2000).
89. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
90. § 2332b(f).
91. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2LI.2, app. n.1(B)(viii) (2002) ("'Terrorism offense'
means any offense involving, or intending to promote, a 'federal crime of terrorism,' as that term is defined in
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)."); see also id. § 3A1.4, app. n.1; United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 513-19
(6th Cir. 2001).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(1) (2000). The statute also contains various jurisdictional requirements. See id.
§ 2332b(b) (2000).
93. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339(a) (West Supp. 2003).
94. Id. The specified offenses include, inter alia, offenses related to destruction of aircraft, 18 U.S.C. §
32, destruction of a nuclear facility, 18 U.S.C. § 1366(a), and aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C.A. § 46502. See 18
U.S.C.A. § 2339(a).
95. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(a) (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
96. Although some of the 35 crimes mentioned in the section require a political motivation for prosecu-
tion, such as 18 U.S.C. § 2332, discussed infra Part II.B, the majority of the statutes referenced have no
political requirement for prosecution or conviction, such as 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, which criminalizes torture by
those outside of the United States.
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tion's definition of providing material support is, however, incorporated into the statute
waiving immunity for foreign states that sponsor terrorism.
97
The terrorism chapter of the federal criminal code also has a deductive definition of
terrorism in § 2332. This section authorizes prosecution for homicidal or violent acts
against a national of the United States "while such national is outside the United
States," 98 but only upon "written certification of the Attorney General or the highest
ranking subordinate of the Attorney General with responsibility for criminal prosecu-
tions that, in the judgment of the certifying official, such offense was intended to coerce,
intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population." 99 Finally, one
section of the terrorism chapter in Title 18 uses a definition of "terrorist organization"
from another portion of the United States Code, the Immigration and Nationality Act.'
°°
There are additional definitions of terrorism in the federal criminal code outside of
the terrorism chapter. These definitions generally are limited to specific types of attacks
and are inductive definitions that do not have a political intent requirement. Section
1993 of Title 18 is entitled "Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass
transportation systems."10' The section title explicitly includes conduct besides terror-
ism through the title phrase "and other acts of violence," and the word "terrorism" does
not appear in the section beyond the tile. This section, enacted in 2001 through the
USA PATRIOT Act, 10 2 criminalizes specified acts of violence and damage against pub-
lic transportation. 10 3 Although some parts of the section contain specific criminal-intent
requirements of endangering safety'1 4 or "caus[ing] death or serious bodily injury," 105
there is no political intent requirement typical of deductive definitions. Thus violence
against mass transportation systems is criminalized by this section, regardless of
whether the perpetrators intended any political purpose by the act.
Similarly, § 43 of the federal criminal code-"Animal enterprise terrorism"- out-
laws specific, limited-context conduct without reference to any political motivation or
objective of the perpetrator. This 1992'06 inductive definition outlaws "physical disrup-
tion to the functioning of an animal enterprise"' 0 7 and intentional damage or loss "of any
property (including animals or records) used by the animal enterprise."' 0 8 Animal en-
97. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000). See generally Keith Sealing, "State Sponsors of Terrorism" Is a
Question, not an Answer: The Terrorism Amendments to the FISA Makes Less Sense Now Than It Did Before
9/11, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 119 (2003).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)-(c) (2000). The section was added in 1986. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 1202(a), 100 Stat. 853, 896-97. It was amended in
1992. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 1003(a)(3), 106 Stat. 4506,
4521-22.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d)
100. Id. § 2339B(g)(6) (referring to organizations designated pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189). See generally
Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing and
narrowing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B). The designation of "terrorist organizations" under immigration law is dis-
cussed infra, Part III.C.
101. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1993 (West Supp. 2003).
102. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Avoiding Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 801, 115 Stat. 272, 374-76
(2001) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1993(a)).
103. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1993(a) (West Supp. 2003).
104. Id. § 1993(a)(2)-(3), (5).
105. Id. § 1993(a)(6).
106. See Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-346, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 928, 928 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (2000).
108. Id. § 43(a)(2); but see SCHMID, supra note 10, at 84-85 (questioning whether attacks against non-
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terprises include commercial and academic institutes that use animals in research and
testing, 0 9 as well as, inter alia, zoos, circuses, and rodeos.' 10 Since there is no require-
ment for political motivation, any intentional physical destruction of an animal enter-
prise is "animal enterprise terrorism" under this section.
The firearms chapter"' of the federal criminal code contains another limited-
context definition of terrorism, although this definition is deductive and contains a po-
litical component. This provision, enacted in 1986,12 defines terrorism as an:
activity, directed against United States persons, which-
(A) is committed by an individual who is not a national or permanent resident alien of
the United States;
(B) involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life which would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States; and
(C) is intended--
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping." 3
This is similar to the FISA definition of terrorism, 1 4 except that the jurisdictional
requirement of the FISA definition is replaced by limitations on both the perpetrators
and the victims. To fall under this provision, the activity must be performed by a person
who not is a national or permanent resident of the United States and must be "directed
against United States persons."" 5 Like other deductive definitions of terrorism, this
provision requires a violent, unlawful act' 16 that is done for a political purpose.' 17
This is arguably the least significant federal definition of terrorism due to its pecu-
liar procedural context. The definition is part of the statue criminalizing the conduct of
"engag[ing] in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms" without
a license. 1 8 The statute limits criminal liability to those "with the principal objective of
livelihood and profit,"'" 9 except that "proof of profit shall not be required as to a person
who engages in the regular and repetitive purchase and disposition of firearms for
criminal purposes or terrorism."'' 20  Thus, under this statutory scheme, a person who
regularly and repeatedly purchases firearms for terrorists can be prosecuted without the
necessity of showing that the conduct was for profit. One commentator observed, "[t]he
incongruity of requiring the licensing of terrorist supply depots is matched by the incon-
humans can properly be classified as terrorism).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(1)(A).
110. See id. § 43(d)(l)(B).
111. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-931 (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
112. See Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 101(6), 100 Stat. 449, 450 (1986) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22)).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22) (2000). The terrorism definition is part of the definition "with the principal
objective of livelihood and profit." Id.
114. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000). See supra Part III.A.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22)(A) (2000).
116. See id. § 921(a)(22)(B).
117. See id. § 921(a)(22)(C).
118. Id. § 922(a)(1)(A).
119. Id. § 921(a)(21).
120. Id. § 921(a)(22)(A). Even when the purchases are not for terrorism or criminal purposes, many courts
have declined to find that the statute requires proof of profit. See United States v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094,
1103 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that a majority of cases have concluded "that a defendant need not be shown to
have acted with profit-making intent or engaged in the sale of firearms as his primary business in order to be
convicted under the statute").
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gruity of the wording employed"'' 2 and accurately predicted in 1987 that "[t]he scope of
this exception is likely to remain untested."'
122
C. Immigration Law Definitions
The definitions of terrorism that include the greatest amount of conduct are in im-
migration law. Terrorism-related amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952,123 most recently through the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, significantly impact
aliens in or seeking to enter the United States. Included in the grounds which make an
alien inadmissible to the United States are definitions of "terrorist activity" and "en-
gag[ing] in terrorist activity."
The definition for "terrorist activities" is:
any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or
which, if it had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the
laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following:
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or
vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, an-
other individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organiza-
tion) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the re-
lease of the individual seized or detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section
11 16(b)(4) of Title 18) or upon the liberty of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any-
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for
mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly,
the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to prop-
erty.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.124
This broad definition is not perfectly classifiable as either deductive or inductive. While
most provisions of this definition do not contain a political motivation, one subsection
requires that the act be "in order to compel a third person (including a governmental
organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for
the release of the individual seized or detained."' 25 The substantive element specifies
certain activities traditionally associated with terrorism, such as highjacking 126 and as-
sassination, 127 as well as activities not inherently seen as terrorism, such as the use of a
"firearm ... (other than for mere personal monetary gain) with intent to endanger, di-
rectly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals."' 1 8 There is no jurisdictional
121. David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners' Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17
CUMB. L. REV. 585, 633 (1987).
122. Id. There appear to be no published cases on this terrorism definition. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 (2000
& West Supp. 2003).
123. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
124. 8 U.S.C.A § 182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 2003).
125. Id. § l182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(ll).
126. See id. § 1 182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
127. See id. § 182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(IV).
128. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V).
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requirement, although this provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act generally
applies only to aliens.
In addition to the above definition of "terrorist activity," the same section of the
Immigration and Nationality Act further defines the phrase "engage in terrorist activ-
ity.' 29 Portions of this definition reference the "terrorist activity" definition, such as
preparing or planning a terrorist activity,' 30 gathering "information on potential targets
for terrorist activity,' 131 and committing or inciting a terrorist activity "under circum-
stances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury."' 132 Additionally,
the definition of "engage in terrorist activity" also includes soliciting "funds or other
things of value,"' 3 3 for a terrorist activity, 34 or for a terrorist organization. 135 Likewise,
the "engage in terrorist activity" definition includes soliciting any individual to engage
in terrorism 136 or to join a terrorist organization. 137 Finally, the definition of "engage in
terrorist activity" includes providing "material support, including a safe house, transpor-
tation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false
documentation or identification, weapons ... explosives, or training' ' 38 for "the com-
mission of a terrorist activity"'139 to a person "who the actor knows, or reasonably should
know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity,"' 14 or to a terrorist organi-
zation. 14 1 The provisions for soliciting funds, recruiting members, and providing mate-
rial support all have exceptions for organizations that have not been designated as "ter-
rorist organizations" when the solicitor, recruiter, or supporter "can demonstrate that he
did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the [solicita-
tion/recruiting/supporting] would further the organization's terrorist activity.', 142
Like the definition of "terrorist activity," the definition of "engage in terrorist activ-
ity" contains elements common to both deductive and inductive definitions. The sub-
stantive element is broad, including soliciting "anything of value"'143 or soliciting pro-
spective members'" for certain organizations. Aspects of the definition do not have any
explicit intent requirement, such as soliciting funds for a recognized terrorist organiza-
tion, 145 while other aspects have an affirmative defense for the reasonable lack of
129. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
130. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(fl).
131. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(fl).
132. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I).
133. Id. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(V).
134. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(aa).
135. See id. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(bb)-(cc).
136. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V)(aa).
137. See id. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V)(bb)-(cc).
138. Id. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
139. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(aa).
140. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb).
141. See id. §§ l182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc)-(dd).
142. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc); id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V)(cc); id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd). See
also id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I)-(lH) (the designation of organizations as "terrorist organizations").
143. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(aa)-(cc).
144. Id. § l182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V)(aa)-(cc); see also U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-03-266, Justice
Department: Better Management Oversight and Internal Controls Needed to Ensure Accuracy of Terrorism-
Related Statistics (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03266.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2004) [hereinafter GAO, BETTER MANAGEMENT] ("The term 'engage in terrorist activity' . .. encompasses
not only the commission of terrorist activities, but a broad range of conduct in support of terrorist activities,
generally involving such things as preparation or planning; gathering information on potential targets; solicit-
ing funds or members; or affording material support.").
145. E.g., 8 U.S.C.A. § 182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(aa)-(bb).
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knowledge. 46 As has been observed, "the plain text of law would allow deportation of a
non-citizen who donates coloring books to a daycare center run by an organization that
also has terrorist ties," although "such a result is not automatic.' 147 The definition does
not contain an explicit jurisdictional requirement, although it typically applies only to
persons who are not citizens of the United States.
The immigration consequences of the definitions for "terrorist activity" and "engage
in terrorist activity" are significant. A determination that an alien has engaged in or will
engage in "terrorist activities" bars an alien from being admitted into the United
States 148 and serves as a ground of deportability for an alien otherwise lawfully in the
country." 9 An alien determined by the Attorney General to have engaged in terrorist
activity is subject to mandatory detention. 150 Likewise, the Attorney General is author-
ized to remove without a hearing aliens seeking admission to the United States who are
suspected of engaging in terrorist activity. 151 Even spouses and children of those deter-
mined to have engaged in terrorist activities are inadmissible to the United States if the
terrorist activity occurred within the last five years. 52 A determination that a person
engaged in terrorist activity bars asylum, 5 3 admission as a refugee,' 54 and most other
immigration benefits. 1
55
The definition of "engaging in terrorist activity" is also used in designation of "ter-
rorist organizations" by the Secretary of State.' 56  Such a designation removes the
affirmative defense based on a reasonable lack of knowledge for those who raise funds
for, 157 recruit members for, 158 or provide material support to' 59 designated organizations
146. E.g., id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V)(cc); id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc); id. § l182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd).
147. McCarthy, supra note 68, at 452; see also Zard, supra note 43, at 935 ("[The USA PATRIOT Act
also allows for the detention and deportation of non-citizens who provide lawful assistance to groups that are
not officially designated as terrorist organizations.").
148. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
149. Id. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a. Persons detained under this section must be released unless they are criminally
charged or placed in removal proceedings within 7 days. Id. § 1226a(a)(5). See In re U-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec.
355, 357 (BIA 2002) ("This section imposes mandatory detention for an alien who the Attorney General has
reasonable grounds to believe is engaged in terrorist activity or is a danger to national security."). See also 8
U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(2) (2000) (discussing the detention of aliens with a final removal order who have been found
to have engaged in terrorist activity).
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2000).
152. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII) (2000 & West Supp. 2003). There are exceptions when the spouse
or child did not or should not have known about the terrorist activity, or when the person who engaged in
terrorist activity has renounced the activity. Id. § I 182(a)(3)(B)(ii).
153. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v) (2000). See generally Zard, supra note 43. Engaging in terrorist activity
is not an absolute bar to a similar protection, restriction on removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2000), al-
though a belief that a person is a danger to the community is a basis for denial, see id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv)
(2000). But see Cheema v. INS, 350 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the argument that a person
who engages in terrorism is inherently a danger to the community).
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (2000) (stating that the terrorist grounds of inadmissibility, 8 U.S.C. §
11 82(a)(3), cannot be waived).
155. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2) (2000) (requiring that applicants for adjustment of status be admissi-
ble to the United States); id. § 1254a(c)(2)(A)(iii)(III) (2000) (temporary protective status); 8 U.S.C.A. §
1229b(c)(4) (West Supp. 2003) (cancellation of removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2000) (registry).
156. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2003); id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II). Some courts have upheld
constitutional challenges to portions of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189. See Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of
State, 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C. Cit. 2001) (ruling that due process can require the putative terrorist organiza-
tion to be notified of the pending designation); United States v. Rahami, 209 F. Supp.2d 1045, 1058 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 1189 unconstitutional).
157. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV) (West Supp. 2003).
158. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V).
159. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
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under the definition of "engage in terrorist activity." In other words, a person who
raises funds for or otherwise assists a designated organization is considered to have
engaged in terrorist activities regardless of the person's knowledge or motives. Like-
wise, a determination that an organization is a foreign terrorist organization requires the
suspension of the organization's tax-exempt status' 60 and authorizes the Secretary of
Treasury to seize the assets of the organization.1 6' The immigration law definitions of
terrorism are significant both for their consequences and for the breadth of activities
covered.
D. State Department Definitions
Additional statutory definitions of terrorism relate to the Department of State. The
provision requiring the State Department to prepare annual country reports on terrorism
provides that "the term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents."1 62 This concise definition of terrorism, enacted in 1987,163 is a deductive defini-
tion with a substantive element of "violence perpetrated against noncombatant tar-
gets1M64 and an intent requirement that the violence be "politically motivated."' 165 There
is no jurisdictional requirement, although the section generally relates to international
terrorism. 66 The definition has limitations for both the perpetrator, "subnational groups
or clandestine agents," 167 and the victim, "noncombatant targets."'168 Limiting the defi-
nition to "noncombatant targets" would seemingly exclude attacks on military targets,
such as the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military barracks in Saudi Arabia.'
69
In addition to providing the standard for the State Department's annual terrorism
reports, this definition also is used in conjunction with the immigration law definition of
engaging in terrorism activity 7 in the Secretary of State's designations of "foreign
terrorist organizations."' 7' As discussed above, the immigration implications for such
designations are immense. 17 2 Also, the definition is employed as part of a statutory bar
160. Military Family Tax Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 108-121, § 108, 117 Stat. 1335, (2003) (to be codified at
26 U.S.C. § 501(p)(2)(A)).
161. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2003). The authority to seize assets is not activated, how-
ever, by a designation pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II), only designations under 8 U.S.C.A. §
1189(a)(1)(B). See id. § 1189(a)(1)(B).
162. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2000). See also Noteboom, supra note 8, at 569 ("The strength and weak-
ness of this definition is its simplicity."). The same definition is also used in State Department reports on
terrorist assets in the United States. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656g(b)(2) (2000).
163. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 140(c)(2),
101 Stat. 1331, 1349 (1987) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2656f).
164. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2000).
165. Id.
166. See id. § 2656f. The section defines "international terrorism" as "terrorism involving citizens or the
territory of more than 1 country," id. § 2656f(d)(1), and "terrorist group" as "any group practicing, or which
has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism," id. § 2656f(d)(3).
167. Id. § 2656f(d)(2).
168. Id.
169. See MALIK, supra note 2, at 45; Noteboom, supra note 8, at 570.
170. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 182(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2003). See supra Part m1I.C for a discussion of that defini-
tion. Such a designation, whether under the immigration law definitions or 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2), can cause
an organization to lose its tax-exempt status. Military Family Tax Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 108-121, § 108, 117
Stat. 1335 (2003) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(p)(2)) (referring to, inter alia, the statute creating 22
U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2), the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).
171. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
172. See supra Part HI.C.
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to the Defense Department providing financial assistance to countries determined to
have supported "international terrorism."'
173
Another definition of terrorism relates to the Secretary of State's authority to grant
rewards for providing information about international terrorism. 174 The definition, en-
acted in 1998,175 provides:
The term 'act of international terrorism' includes:
(A) any act substantially contributing to the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nu-
clear material ... or any nuclear explosive device.., by an individual, group, or non-
nuclear-weapon state... ; and
(B) any act, as determined by the Secretary, which materially supports the conduct of
international terrorism, including the counterfeiting of United States currency or the
illegal use of other monetary instruments by an individual, group, or country support-
ing international terrorism .... 176
While subparagraph (A) provides an inductive definition with a limited substantive
element related to nuclear material or devices and without a political intent requirement,
subparagraph (B) is so broad that it does not have sufficient boundaries to be classified
as either inductive or deductive. Subparagraph (B) allows the Secretary of State exten-
sive discretion in determining what acts "materially support the conduct of international
terrorism" and therefore constitute international terrorism under this definition. 177 Be-
cause this definition is limited to the reward-granting authority of the Secretary of State,
it is of limited significance.
E. Other Statutory Definitions
Congress has enacted additional statutory definitions of terrorism in various other
contexts. The Homeland Security Act of 2002,178 which, inter alia, created the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, contains two statutory definitions of terrorism. The "defi-
nitions" section of the Act defines terrorism as:
any activity that-
(A) involves an act that-
(i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastruc-
ture or key resources; and
(ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or
other subdivision of the United States; and
(B) appears to be intended--
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
or kidnapping. 
179
173. 10 U.S.C. § 2249a(c) (2000).
174. 22 U.S.C. § 2708 (2000).
175. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
§ 2202, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-807 (1998), amended by State Department Basic Authorities Act Amendments
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-323, § 101, 112 Stat. 3029, 3031-32.
176. 22 U.S.C. §27080)(1) (2000).
177. Id. § 2708(j)(1)(B).
178. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
179. Id. § 2(15), 116 Stat. at 2141.
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This is a deductive definition with a substantive element requiring a dangerous act
in violation of an American criminal law180 and a political motivation identical to that
found in the § 2331 definitions of terrorism.' 8 1 Unlike the § 2331 definitions, however,
the Homeland Security Act's definition does not have a jurisdictional component; an act
fitting this definition would be considered terrorism wherever it occurred.
Although the Homeland Security Act constitutes a significant reorganization of the
federal government, combining all or part of twenty-two different agencies into the new
Department of Homeland Security, 182 the Act's definition of terrorism is not particularly
significant since it only applies in limited circumstances such as rules governing pro-
curement. 18 3 Although the Act, inter alia, abolished the Immigration and Naturalization
Service'84 and incorporated its functions into the new department, 185 the Homeland Se-
curity Act does not alter the existing definitions of terrorism in immigration law applied
by the new department.
The Homeland Security Act provides another definition of terrorism in a portion
concerning anti-terrorism technology. Section 865 of the Act defines "act of terrorism"
as an act that:
(i) is unlawful;
(ii) causes harm to a person, property, or entity, in the United States, or in the case of
a domestic United States air carrier or a United States-flag vessel (or a vessel based
principally in the United States on which United States income tax is paid and whose
insurance coverage is subject to regulation in the United States), in or outside the
United States; and
(iii) uses or attempts to use instrumentalities, weapons or other methods designed or
intended to cause mass destruction, injury or other loss to citizens or institutions of
the United States. 1
86
This is essentially a deductive definition, although without a political motivation re-
quirement. Rather, an unlawful act that causes harm to someone or something in the
United States by means designed to cause mass destruction would be terrorism under
this definition if the Secretary of Homeland Security determines it satisfies the defimi-
tion's requirements.1
87
This definition relates to a federal cause of action created by the Act "for claims
arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism when qualified anti-
terrorism technologies have been deployed in defense against or response or recovery
from such act and such claims result or may result in loss to the Seller."'188 The defini-
tion is only applicable in such causes of action brought by sellers of "qualified anti-
terrorism technologies," which must be certified by the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
180. Id. § 2(15)(A), 116 Stat. at 2141.
181. Compare id. § 2(15)(B), 116 Stat. at 2141, with 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1)(B) (2000 & West Supp. 2003),
and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(5)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
182. See Helen Dewar, Homeland Security Bill Sent to White House, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2002, at A3.
183. See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation; Procurements for Defense Against or Recovery From Ter-
rorism or Nuclear, Biological, Chemical or Radiological Attack, 68 Fed. Reg. 4048 (Jan. 27, 2003) (incorpo-
rating the Homeland Security Act terrorism definition in interim procurement rules for agencies involved in
defending against a terrorist attack or the recovery after such an attack).
184. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. at 2205.
185. Id. §§ 441-60, 116 Stat. at 2192-2201.
186. Id. § 865(2)(B), 116 Stat. at 2242.
187. Id. § 865(2)(A), 116 Stat. at 2242.
188. Id. § 863(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 2239.
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rity.' 89 Since the definition applies in only narrow circumstances it is of very limited
significance.
Another recent statutory definition of terrorism was created through the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002.19' In this statute, the term:
'act of terrorism' means any act that is certified by the Secretary [of Treasury], in concur-
rence with the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General of the United States-
(i) to be an act of terrorism;
(ii) to be a violent act or an act that is dangerous to-a
(I) human life;
(II) property;
(III) infrastructure;
(iii) to have resulted in damage within the United States, or outside of the United
States in the case of-
(I) an air carrier or vessel [based and insured in the United States];
(II) the premise of a United States mission; and
(iv) to have been committed by an individual or individual acting on behalf of any
foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to coerce the civilian population
of the United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United
States Government by coercion.1 9
1
This is a deductive definition with a substantive requirement of a violent act dangerous
to human life, property, or infrastructure, 92 a motivation requirement that the act be part
of an effort to coerce or influence the United States population or government, 93 and a
jurisdictional requirement that the damage occur within the United States, at a United
States mission or to a craft based in the United States. 194 The definition further requires
certification by the Secretary of the Treasury that the conduct satisfies the Act's re-
quirements. 95 Additionally, for an act to qualify under the definition, it must be per-
formed on behalf of a foreign individual or interest,' 96 and, oddly, it must also be "an act
of terrorism."' 97 Presumably, the Secretary of the Treasury could determine that con-
duct is not an act of terrorism, despite otherwise satisfying the requirements of the defi-
nition.
This definition of terrorism, as apparent from the Act's title, concerns insurance for
terrorism. Although the Act is significant to insurance carriers,198 its definition of terror-
ism is not particularly significant.
Another recent definition is from the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of
2001,'99 which defines an "act of terrorism" as:
189. Id. § 863(d)(3), 116 Stat. at 2240.
190. Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
191. Id. § 102(I)(A), 116 Stat. at 2323-24.
192. Id. § 102(l)(A)(ii), 116 Stat. at 2323.
193. Id. § 102(1)(A)(iv), 116 Stat. at 2324.
194. Id. § 102(1)(A)(iii), 116 Stat. at 2324; see also Omni Berkshire Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
2003 WL 1900822, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2003) (The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act definition of terrorism
"does not apply to acts of domestic terrorism.").
195. Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(l)(A), 116 Stat. at 2323-24. The statute bars the Secretary from delegat-
ing the certification authority. Id. § 102(D). The Secretary's determinations are not subject to judicial review.
Id. § 102(C).
196. Id. § 102(l)(A)(iv), 116 Stat. at 2324.
197. Id. § 102(1)(A)(i), 116 Stat. at 2323.
198. See generally Joseph G. Jarret, The Business of Terrorism: The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002,
77 FLA. BAR J. 63 (Oct. 2003).
199. Pub. L. No. 107-7 1, § 129(2), 115 Stat. 597, 633 (2001) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44703(g)(3)).
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an activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a viola-
tion of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any
State, and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population to influ-
ence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion or to affect the conduct
of a government by assassination or kidnaping [sic].200
This is a deductive definition nearly identical to the FISA definition of international
terrorism 2° ' except there is no jurisdictional requirement. This definition is not espe-
cially significant since it only applies in the limited context of the issuance of "airman"
202
certificates by the Federal Aviation Administration.
Finally, a definition of "act of international terrorism" was enacted as part of the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.203 This un-codified definition is likewise nearly
identical to the FISA definition 2 04 except that there is no jurisdictional element--despite
claiming to be a definition of "international terrorism." This definition is part of a stat-
ute establishing fines for investing in Iranian and Libyan industries due to a Congres-
sional finding that those countries have supported "international terrorism.
20 5
F. Executive Branch Definitions
Congress is not the only source of federal legal definitions of terrorism. The execu-
tive branch of the federal government promulgated at least two definitions. A definition
for terrorism was part of an Executive Order concerning asset seizure issued by Presi-
dent George W. Bush shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Executive Order
13224 defines terrorism as:
an activity that-
(i) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure;
and
(ii) appears to be intended-
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
kidnapping, or hostage-taking.
20 6
This is a deductive definition with a substantive portion and a political portion, although
there is no jurisdictional requirement. The definition is similar, although not identical,
to the substantive and the political motivation portions of FISA and § 2331 defini-
tions.20 7 This definition is significant since the executive order authorizes the seizure of
200. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44703(g)(3).
201. Compare id. § 44703(g)(3), with 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000).
202. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44703(g).
203. Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14(1), 110 Stat. 1541, 1549 (1996).
204. Compare id., with 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000). There are some minor stylistic differences, such as the
use of the phrase "an act.., which is violent or dangerous to human life" in the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 14(1), 110 Stat. at 1549, while FISA contains "violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life." See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c).
205. Pub. L. No. 104-172, §§ 2(3)-(4), 110 Stat. at 1541.
206. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,080 (Sept. 23, 2001).
207. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2000); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331(1) (2000 & West Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C.A §
2331(5) (West Supp. 2003). The motivational component of the Executive Order concerning affecting gov-
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assets of groups that "assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological
support for ... acts of terrorism.
20 8
Another executive branch definition of terrorism can be found in the regulation dis-
cussing the duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 209  Under this regulation,
"[t]errorism includes the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property
to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives. '210 This is a deductive definition with a
substantive element of "unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property"
and a motivation element of intimidating or coercing a government or population "in
furtherance of political or social objectives." 21' There is no jurisdictional element.
This definition is not legally significant since it has no legal consequences. Rather,
it is included in the list of functions of the FBI, which declare that the FBI is the lead
agency to investigate crimes "which involve terrorist activities. 2 12 The regulation does
not preclude other governmental agencies from investigating terrorism, but rather "[in-
vestigative agencies are] requested to promptly notify the FBI. 213 Likewise, the regula-
tion does not limit the FBI investigation to activities falling within that definition.21 4
Additionally, the use of the phrase "terrorism includes"215 signals that the definition is
not intended to cover all possible acts of terrorism. While not legally significant, the
definition is frequently cited by commentators as an example of a legal definition of
terrorism.
2 16
IV. OPTIONS FOR THE MULTIPLE LEGAL DEFINITIONS
The federal legal definitions of terrorism discussed above are inconsistent as to
what constitutes terrorism, differing on, inter alia, the requirements of a political moti-
vation217 and even the nature of the victims.21 8 This section discusses three options in
emmental conduct includes "mass destruction," which is not part of FISA, and "hostage-taking," which is not
part of the FISA or section 2331 definitions. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,224, § l(d)(ii)(C), 66 Fed. Reg. at
49,080, with § 1801(c)(2)(C), and § 2331(l)(B)(iii) (2000 & West Supp. 2003), and § 2331(5)(B)(iii) (West
Supp. 2003).
208. Exec. Order No. 13224, § l(d)(i), 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,080; see also Global Relief Found., Inc. v.
O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying the executive order); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v.
Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp.2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002), aft'd, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same).
209. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(/) (2003).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. See GAO, BETrER MANAGEMENT, supra note 144, at 7 (discussing how FBI terrorism-related
investigations need not fall under the terrorism definition of 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l)).
215. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2003)(emphasis added).
216. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 6, at 12; HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 38; Noteboom, supra note 8, at
558-59; Beres, supra note 13, at 240.
217. Compare, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(2) (2000), and 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22) (2000), and 28 C.F.R. §
0.85(l) (2003), and 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2000), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1993(a) (West Supp. 2003), and 18
U.S.C. § 43(a) (2000), and 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a)(3)(I), (III)-(V) (West Supp. 2003), and 22 U.S.C. §
27080)( 1)(A) (2000).
218. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2000) (limited to "noncombatant targets"), with 18 U.S.C. §
2332(a) (2000) (limiting terrorism to acts against a national of the United States), with 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22)
(2000) (limiting terrorism to acts directed against "United States persons"), with Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 865(2)(B), 116 Stat. 2135, 2242 (limiting terrorism to persons, property or
entities in the United States or United States aircraft or vessels).
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addressing the situation: maintaining the status quo, abandoning the attempt to legally
define terrorism, or adopting a single definition.
A. Maintaining the Status Quo
The principal benefit to numerous legal definitions of terrorism is that each defini-
tion can be individualized to best serve its intended purpose. As one commentator has
observed, the different legal definitions "reflect[] the priorities and particular interests of
the specific agency involved. 219 It is logical that different standards are used for mak-
ing determinations relating to vastly different public-policy objectives, such as deter-
mining which aliens are permitted to enter the United States, the circumstances needed
for the government to obtain a warrant to conduct surveillance, or the basis for insurance
coverage for terrorist attacks. In other words, there is method, or at least justification, to
the seeming madness of the numerous definitions for terrorism.
The main drawback to the numerous definitions is that one act may be considered
terrorism under one definition but not under another. 220 As has been observed, the mul-
tiple legal definitions of terrorism result "in overlap, confusion, and ambiguity." 221 Con-
fusion is inherent when a term has multiple legal definitions, even when the defined
term lacks the connotations of terrorism, such as exists with "crime of violence. 22 2
When the defined term has the judgmental connotations of terrorism, the potential for
confusion is augmented. A Congressional committee investigating the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 stated that one of the problems of the intelligence community is "prac-
tically every agency of the United States government with a counterterrorism mission
uses a different definition of terrorism. ' 223 Paraphrasing the cliche, it is almost as if one
agency's terrorist is another agency's freedom fighter. Additionally, it has been noted
that "[c]onflicting definitions [of terrorism] create a problem of notice; individuals are
uncertain which definition applies to them and thus which conduct is prohibited.,
224
More fundamentally, the United States has long been criticized for being inconsistent on
whom it calls a terrorist;22 5 having multiple definitions of terrorism in federal law helps
fuel these criticisms.
219. HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 38; see also Seto, supra note 19, at 1232-34 (discussing how different
conduct would be classified as terrorism under some federal legal definitions but not others); Noteboom, supra
note 8, at 568.
220. See generally LAQUEUR, supra note 9, at 142 ("For unless there is broad agreement on the definition
of [terrorism], there will be the risk that everyone will interpret it in a different way.").
221. Noteboom, supra note 8, at 568; see also Jeffrey F. Addicott, Legal & Policy Implications for a New
Era: The 'War on Terror', 4 SCHOLAR 209, 215 (2002) ("In the United States, the difficulties in definition [of
terrorism]... rest in the sheer number of different government instrumentalities that have offered independent
interpretations which, while similar, are not identical.").
222. See United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (DeMoss, J., concurring)
("There are, in fact, eight different definitions of the term 'crime of violence' in the United States Code and
the United States Sentencing Guidelines."); see also United States v. Vargas-Duran, 319 F.3d 194, 203 (5th
Cir. 2003) (Clement, J., dissenting) (referring to "the irrationality of having several definitions of 'crime of
violence' scattered throughout the U.S. Code and Sentencing Guidelines"), rev'd en banc, 356 F.3d. 598 (5th
Cir. 2004).
223. SUBCOMMrTrEE ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY, HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 107TH CONG., REPORT ON COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES AND
PERFORMANCE PRIOR TO 9-11 (July 2002), available at http://www.fas.orglirp/congress/2002_rpt/
hpsci_ths0702.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
224. Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights after Oklahoma City, 109 HARV. L. REv. 2074, 2086 (1996).
225. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 8, at 890 (referring to the State Department list of terrorist states as "a
kind of hypocrisy"); WHITE, supra note 6, at 8; James T. Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The Taking of Joe
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B. Abandoning Legal Definitions of Terrorism
One possible solution to the numerous legal definitions of terrorism is to abandon
the legal definitional quest. Three decades ago, R.R. Baxter lamented the meeting of
terrorism and law: "We have cause to regret that a legal concept of 'terrorism' was ever
inflicted upon us. The term is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no
operative legal purpose.' 226 As another commentator summarized, "terrorism is not a
legal term of art.
'
,227
Similar to the scholarly discussion on the difficulties of defining terrorism, several
reasons have been offered for why terrorism is not well-suited for legal definition. First,
"it is virtually impossible to anticipate all potential scenarios, or to devise a legal
scheme that specifically identifies every possible terrorist armed attack. ' 228 Further,
most terrorist acts are already criminal acts under statutes covering murder, kidnapping,
explosives, or conspiracy,229 so that terrorism laws, arguably, serve no useful legal pur-
pose. Additionally, it has been argued that legal definitions of terrorism "are quite use-
less because they account for neither the social nor the political nature of terrorism.
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Precisely because terrorism is politically motivated, "it is only in the realm of the politi-
cal that these definitions [of terrorism] have any useful employment., 231 The political
motivation of terrorism separates it from ordinary crime.232 Finally, since the use of the
word "terrorism" is, at least to some, judgmental and subjective, 233 it is ill-suited for the
(ideally) objective nature of legal definitions.234
The abandonment of legal definitions of terrorism, while appealing in some ways, is
not feasible. The criticism that the American government is inconsistent in dealing with
terrorism would undoubtedly increase if legal definitions of terrorism were abandoned.
Further, although not a war in the constitutional sense,235 a war on terrorism has been
proclaimed by the President236 and supported by Congress through resolutions. 237 It is
Doherty, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 317, 398 (1992) (comparing the imprisonment of an Irish Republican "terror-
ist" Joe Doherty with the White House reception of South African "terrorist" Nelson Mandela).
226. R.R. Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380, 380 (1974).
227. Guy R. Roberts, Self-help in Combating State Sponsored Terrorism: Self Defense and Peacetime
Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 243, 249 (1987); see also MALIK, supra note 2, at 22 ("Terrorism is not
... a precise juridical term.").
228. Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 216; see also HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 15; WHITE, supra note 6, at
3.
229. See CHARLES DOYLE, TERRORISM AT HOME: A QUICK LOOK AT APPLICABLE FEDERAL AND STATE
CRIMINAL LAWS, CONG. RES. SERV. No. R521033, at 1 (2001) ("The conduct we most often associate with
terrorism - bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnapping, threats-are generally outlawed by both
federal and state law."); see also WHITE, supra note 6, at 7 ("[A]II terrorist activity involves criminal activ-
ity.").
230. WHITE, supra note 6, at 8; see also LAQUEUR, supra note 9, at 144 ("The application of legal norms is
of little help in establishing the political character of a terrorist movement.").
231. Cooper, supra note 8, at 885; accord MALIK, supra note 2, at 52 ("General convention has long held
that terrorism must have a political component."); SCHMID, supra note 10, at 57 ("Terrorism, in everyday
parlance, is often seen as political crime or political murder." (emphasis added)).
232. See SCHMID, supra note 10, at 25-32; MALIK, supra note 2, at 23; WHITE, supra note 6, at 19-22;
Cooper, supra note 8, at 885.
233. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 6, at 4; HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 31; Cooper, supra note 12, at 106;
Porras, supra note 6, at 124.
234. See generally Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 388 n.57 (1994) ("[A]ny
legal definition must be expressed in terms of the objective characteristics .....
235. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
236. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye & Elisabeth Bumiller, After Attacks: The President; Bush Labels Aerial
Attacks 'Acts of War', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at A16.
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illogical for the United States to have a war on something it does not even attempt to
define, and "[t]he 'w' word has been used and now cannot be withdrawn. 238
Additionally, the United States has traditionally, although not uniformly, treated ter-
rorism as a legal matter.239 Indeed, to some people, support for, and reliance on the law
differentiates democracies from terrorists. 240 It is thus not appropriate to abandon the
quest for a legal definition of terrorism. As Baxter acknowledged in his article lament-
ing the meeting of terrorism and law, "we must make the best of matters and see what
can be made of this notion of terrorism." 241
C. A Single Definition
The final alternative to the numerous legal definitions of terrorism is to amend the
existing definitions into a single definition applicable in all relevant circumstances. A
Congressional subcommittee investigating the attacks of September 11, 2001 recom-
mended a single definition for terrorism.242 The subcommittee noted that nearly every
federal agency involved in counter-terrorism used a different definition of terrorism and
recommended that all governmental agencies "charged with the counterterrorism mis-
sion should agree on a single definition, so that it would be clear what activity consti-
tutes a terrorist act and who should be designated a terrorist. '243  While it is ironic for a
congressional body to be criticizing the executive branch for having so many definitions
of terrorism when the legislative branch is the source of the vast majority of definitions,
the recommendation for a unified definition has merit. In addition to eliminating the
problems discussed above with numerous definitions, such as inconsistency in determin-
ing what terrorism is and the lack of notice, a single definition would allow better com-
munication between law enforcement and intelligence agencies dealing with terror-
ism.244 The General Accounting Office has warned that without a commonly accepted
237. See, e.g., Condemnation of Terrorist Attacks of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-39, § 7, 115 Stat. 222, 222
(Congress "commits to support increased resources in the war to eradicate terrorism.").
238. See also Michael Howard, What's in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 8,10 (2002).
239. Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1224 (2002)
("[T]he United States has traditionally treated terrorism as a crime."); see also BREMER, supra note 3, at 2
("[T]he firm hand of the law is the best defense against terrorism."); Abraham D. Sofaer, Playing Games with
Terrorists, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 903, 903 (2002) (arguing that criminal prosecutions has been the United
States' predominate weapon against terrorism). But see Jacques deLisle, The New Protracted Conflict: The
Roles of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism, 46 ORBIs 301, 306 (2002) ("Yet, for all its appeal, the law para-
digm has failed to become the dominant model of the United States' fight against terrorism .... ); WHITE,
supra note 6, at 269 ("The only thing one can say is the United States have been consistently inconsistent with
its answer [on whether terrorism is a crime or an act of war]."). See generally Ronald J. Sievert, War on
Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307 (2003).
240. See, e.g., BREMER, supra note 3, at 2 ("Terrorists despise democracy because democracy cherishes
that which the terrorists seek to destroy: the sanctity of the individual and the rule of law."); see also Porras,
supra note 6, at 139 ("The complaint is that the terrorist respects no law-not the criminal law, not moral law,
not the law of peace, and not the law of war.").
241. Baxter, supra note 226, at 380.
242. SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 223. The report suggests its
own terrorism definition: "Terrorism is the illegitimate, premeditated use of politically motivated violence or
the threat of violence by a sub-national group against persons or property with the intent to coerce a govern-
ment by installing fear amongst the populace." Id.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY 42 (2002) (proposing, inter alia, an incident management system that "would ensure
that this national system defines common terminology for all parties"). The strategy also proposed a definition
of terrorism, "characteriz[ing] terrorism as any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public
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governmental definition of terrorism, "the potential exists for an uncoordinated ap-
proach to combating terrorism caused by duplication in efforts or gaps in coverage, mis-
allocation of resources, and inadequate monitoring of expenditures. '245 The adoption of
a single definition of terrorism offers significant benefits including reduced confusion,
more effective communication between governmental agencies, and the maintenance of
more accurate statistics on terrorism and counter-terrorism.
246
The negative aspects of a single definition relate to the limitations it imposes. A
single definition requires that the federal agencies apply the same legal standard in a
wide variety of contexts, so that the determination of the Secretary of State, on which
organizations engage in terrorism, would be the same standard when applied in authoriz-
ing surveillance under FISA as when determining the admissibility of aliens. Determi-
nations serving such diverse public policy goals and their corresponding societal impli-
cations may require different definitions. Additionally, drafters face difficulties writing
an all-inclusive definition since it should ideally "include all that it seeks to define" and
"exclude all else., 247 Further, because the attributes of terrorism change over time,248 a
definition with such wide consequences makes the inevitable amendment process more
difficult since, at least in theory, the proposed changes require more contemplation on
the part of Congress to the definition in light of its the wider-reaching consequences.
V. CONCLUSION
Following the many eager souls who joined the definitional quest, federal lawmak-
ers have created twenty-two different definitions of terrorism and related concepts. This
Article has examined the scholarship on defining terrorism, the numerous federal legal
definitions of the term, and three alternatives to the present situation.
While all three alternatives have benefits, the best solution is to seek a single, uni-
fied definition. A single definition would allow better communication between agencies
in the fight against terrorism and provide at least some shielding to charges that the
United States is inconsistent in whom it labels a terrorist. While it may cause draw-
backs, a single definition would ultimately be the most useful tool in the ongoing at-
tempts to control terrorism. By changing the standard under which the single definition
applies, rather than the definition itself, federal agencies could minimize the limitations
caused by a single definition. A criminal conviction would, of course, require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt,249 while other situations could apply a preponderance of the
evidence standard, or, as is presently used in the terrorist prohibition to alien admissions
welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or government." Id. at 2.
245. Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism: Testimony Before
the House Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int'l Relations of the House Comm. on Gov't
Reform, 108th Cong. 7 (2003) (statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and Manage-
ment). Another 2003 GAO publication concluded that a principal reason why different federal agencies were
reporting different numbers of terrorism-related convictions was that the agencies were applying different
definitions of terrorism, and warned that the resulting lack of reliable terrorism-related conviction data would
limit counter-terrorism efforts. See GAO, BETTER MANAGEMENT, supra note 144, at 4, 14.
246. See also Beres, supra note 13, at 239 (The United States "should articulate and apply a single unam-
biguous standard [for terrorism]." (emphasis added)).
247. See MALIK, supra note 2, at xx.
248. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 6, at 3 ("[T]he nature of terrorism has changed over the course of his-
tory."); LAQUEUR, supra note 9, at 11; JENKINS, supra note 24, at 10.
249. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
20041
Journal of Legislation
to the United States, simply "reasonable grounds to believe" that the prohibition ap-
plies.250 Additionally, a mandate, as is already required in certain circumstances, 251 that
a politically-appointed official certify that the action constitutes terrorism under the
definition could limit the misapplication of the definition.
A single federal definition of terrorism would have far-reaching effects, and there-
fore drafters must carefully avoid being over- or under-inclusive.252 An overly-narrow
definition could permit those responsible for terrorism to avoid the legal consequences
of terrorism. Similarly, drafters must take care to ensure that the definition is not
overly-broad since there are significant consequences to the mere use of the word terror-
ism. 253 Indeed, a government that defines the term vaguely or overly-broad risks having
its applications of the term ignored.254 One circuit judge stated that because the word
terrorism "carries far-reaching connotations," it is comparable to treason at the time of
the Constitutional Convention and therefore "must be carefully defined.2 55 Just as the
Constitutional Convention attempted to limit the "malignity" of misapplied and politi-
cally-motivated allegations of treason through a specific, constitutional definition for
treason,256 Congress should use similar care in drafting a single federal definition of
terrorism. The definitional questers from academia would undoubtedly continue their
searches, but Congress, by adopting a single, well-drafted definition, could return to
their other business, much as King Arthur's knights did upon returning from the Grail
Quest.25
7
250. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(A) (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
251. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (2000) (requiring a certification by the Attorney General or the highest
ranking subordinate with the responsibility for criminal prosecutions for a terrorism prosecution under that
section); Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(A), 116 Stat. 2322, 2323
(requiring the certification by the Secretary of Treasury "in concurrence with the Secretary of State, and the
Attorney General of the United States" that the actions falls under the Act's terrorism definition).
252. See MALIK, supra note 2, at 56 ("A definition of terrorism, if it is to be the basis of legal enactment
for the prevention of terrorism, must be worded with great care."); see also Baxter, supra note 226, at 385
("There is perhaps more to be feared in bad law on this subject than there is to be hoped for in good law.").
253. See WHITE, supra note 6, at 4 ("A person is politically and socially degraded when labeled a terrorist,
and the same thing happens when an organization is called a terrorist group .... [Plolitical movements can be
hampered when their followers are believed to be terrorists."); JENKINS, supra note 24, at 1.
254. E.g., Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (disregarding that an Indian national had
been investigated for terrorism since India's terrorism laws are "vague" and "define[] 'terrorism' so broadly"
that many people are investigated for actions not properly considered terrorism).
255. United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 537 (6th Cir. 2001) (Cohn, J., dissenting).
256. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1; see THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) ("But as new-fangled
and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free
government, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great
judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime, fixing
the proof necessary for conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the
consequences of guilt beyond the person of its author.").
257. See THE QUEST OF THE HOLY GRAIL, supra note 1, at 284 ("[H]e journeyed on horseback as far as
Camelot where he found king and court. Never was there such exultation as greeted his arrival .... ).
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